**Malawi-Scotland Governance Webinar 6 – Chat Log**

* **kennethross**: Hi everyone. Ken Ross, chair today, welcome all!
* **David Hope-Jones**: Those in the UK can purchase the book at: <https://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/beyond-impunity>
As Ken says, the main Malawi print run will follow very shortly
* **Moira Dunworth - Mamie Martin Fund**: Thanks - I have ordered mine!
* **John Barker**: Greetings from Cambridge. Thank you for the excellent presentation and tackling a universally important issue. The world has much to learn from Malawi experiences.
* **Alex Jiya**: Great article. Can you clarify the theoretical framework guiding the study? Specifically, can you clarify the theoretical relations among electoral management bodies, demonstrations, and taxes?
* **BANDA**: Two questions for Martin;
(1). Martin said "Malawi is an informal country." Can he clarify what he wanted to say. Is that not demeaning for Malawi. (2) Which particular taxes were Malawians refusing to pay because of being dissatisfied with MEC? Could there be other reasons other than just lumping the blame on MEC?
* **martin**: The work was grounded in , Hardding(1999), normative expectations theory of trust in institutions. Our hypothesized relationship were that: 1) less trust in MEC associates with increased willingness to demonstrate; a protest against mismanaged voting choices. 2) less trust in MEC associates with reduction in willingness to pay taxes; a protest against providing resources to a seemingly illegitimate government.
MEC could, on its own not lead to reduction in willingness to pay taxes, but dissatisfaction with the nature in which a government is ushered into power, could reduce willingness of the people supporting the seemingly illegitimate government.
The data did not specify the type of taxes, so, we were not able to get to such details.
* **BANDA**: To Ngcime: (1) The list of game changers seems to only containing names of women. What role did "men" play during that time if any? Was this a "men" versus "women" struggle?
* **martin**: By "Malawi is an informal country", we meant Malawi's economy is mainly informal, hence, mobilization of formal taxes is difficult."
* **Tony Mwenda Kamninga**: Additionally, to what Martin said, Malawi has of course a formal economy as well. In his presentation he went on to further clarify that the country’s formal tax collection base is PAYE, VAT etc. However, there is a large informal sector in the economy.
* **John Barker**: In the constitutional discussions in 1993-94, many were disappointed that PR was not adopted. It was dismissed by key political representatives on the dubious grounds that 'people were more familiar' with first-past-the-post. It was certainly a carryover from the colonial era but I saw no external agenda in evidence - these choices were very much made by local politicians by then. The argument was that PR could be introduced in local government elections and as people became more familiar with it, it could be introduced in due course at national level. I hope the record shows this. But local government elections were delayed for a long time and I suspect the project was forgotten.
As you point out, first past the post has not served the nation well. Any winner-take-all political system has too close a relationship with a winner-take-all economy, as we are seeing in many countries. The nexus between wealth capture and State capture is all too clear. So if there is resistance to reform, it means that leaders have figured out who is empowered and who is disempowered. Good suggestion to engage the Law Commission. Thank you!